The Microsoft Antitrust Case. This paper analyzes the law and economics of United States v. Microsoft, a landmark case of antitrust intervention in network industries. April 2nd,
The Microsoft Antitrust Case: Rejoinder. During the period between the writing of my Microsoft Antitrust article in this issue and the writing of this rejoinder, the most significant developments in the case were the filing of the appeal of Microsoft, the filing of the government’s objections, and the open hearing of the case by the Washington DC court of appeals sitting en banc in late February 2001. The questioning of both sides by the judges of the court of appeals was very frank and pointed. April 2nd, 2001.
The new Economy and Beyond: Past, Present and Future. Competition policy in network industries.
Did Microsoft Harm Consumers? United States v. Microsoft is arguably “the” antitrust case of the past decade. It will have important implications for how governments regulate information technologies and the coming Internet explosion. It will also have important consequences for how businesses behave in the marketplace and in the political arena. 2000
Netscape is Dead: Remedy Lessons from the Microsoft Litigation. On March 1, 2008, AOL officially pulled the plug on the Netscape Browser, killing off the killer app of 1995 whose success had led Microsoft on an exclusionary campaign which eventually triggered the now-famous Microsoft monopolization litigation. Although the government plaintiffs in the United States were eventually successful on the merits in the monopolization litigation, Netscape's death highlights the problem of remedy. August 29th, 2008.
United States v. Microsoft: A Failure of Antitrust in the New Economy -By Nicholas Economides. Foreword The United States Department of Justice, joined by the Attorneys General of 20 States and the District of Columbia, filed on May 18, 1998 a major antitrust suit against Microsoft (DOJ Complaint 98-12320).
CREATING COMPETITION IN THE MARKET FOR OPERATING SYSTEMS: A STRUCTURAL REMEDY FOR MICROSOFT. The case against Microsoft raises fundamental questions about the role of antitrust in the digital economy. January, 2000.
The Flawed Fragmentation Critique of Structural Remedies in the Microsoft Case. Among the proposed remedies in the Microsoft case are structural remedies that would create competition in operating systems for personal computers. January 20th, 2000.
REMEDIES BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE: Each of the signatories of this brief is a professional economist with special interest and expertise in the matter now before the Court, namely the design of an appropriate remedy to address Microsoft's antitrust violations. 2000
The Microsoft Monopoly: The Facts, the Law and the Remedy. The Microsoft case is a legitimate and important topic for political debate. Have the antitrust laws outlived their usefulness? Should they be enforced in the high-tech sector of the economy? Is Microsoft a good candidate for such enforcement? Have Microsoft’s actions violated the law and/or harmed consumers? Most importantly, if Microsoft has violated the law, what can or should be done about it? April, 2000.
Microsoft Corporation vs. The U.S. Court of Justice and the European Community. Microsoft was founded on April 4, 1975 by Bill Gates and Paul Allen to develop and sell BASIC interpreters for the Atari 8000. Thirty years later, Microsoft is a global company with presence in almost every country in the world with annual revenues of $60.43 billion. June, 2009.
PRESERVING COMPETITION: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, LEGAL STANDARDS AND MICROSOFT. Antitrust law is a hammer, not a scalpel. It is a blunt instrument that can have a powerful impact but only against something very much like a nail—it cannot be used effectively against small imperfections, to nip and tuck so that the economy can be shaped just so. 1999.
Antitrust in Innovative Industries: We study the effects of antitrust policy in industries with continual innovation. Antitrust policies that restrict incumbent behavior toward new entrants may have conflicting effects on innovation incentives, raising the profits of new entrants, but lowering those of continuing incumbents. 2002.
Misconceptions, Misdirection and Mistakes: Fisher was the principal economic witness for the Antitrust Division in Microsoft. This paper is a rebuttal piece to a paper by David S. Evans and Richard L. Schmalensee, the latter of whom was the principal economic witness for Microsoft. The paper points out that Microsoft did, in fact, harm consumers but beyond that, such harm is not and should not be a requisite for a finding of liability in an antitrust case. The antitrust laws are designed to protect competition, and competition is presumed to protect consumers. April 22th, 2001.